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The right of establishment and free movement of business and capital within the member states of the European Economic Community (EC)
is considered one of the cornerstones of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty).' However, the laws that apply to the
public limited company, the most important business association within
the EC, vary widely among the member states. These differences inhibit
the free movement of business and the right to establish companies, and,
therefore, the EC recently has taken steps to harmonize company law
2
among its members.
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1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts. 52-58, 67-73.
The EEC Treaty is also commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome.
2. In doing so, the EC acts pursuant to Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty which provides that
the Council and Commission carry out their tasks "by coordinating, to the extent that is necessary
and with a view to making them equivalent, the guarantees demanded in Member States from companies .... ." EEC TREATY art. 54(3)(g).
"Companies and firms" as used in this article mean any business constituted under civil or
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private
law, except those which are non-profit. See EEC TREATY art. 58. But as the public limited company is
of paramount importance, the EC company law directives based on Article 54(3)(g) primarily regulate
the public limited company, except the Seventh Council Directive 83/349 of 13 June 1983 Based on
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1; Fourth Council Directive 78/660 of 25 July 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts of
Certain Types of Companies, 1970 O.J. (L 222) 11; First Council Directive 68/151 of 9 March 1968
on Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others,
Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of
Article 58 of the Treaty, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent Throughout the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 41.
Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, but they leave to national authorities the
choice of methods to be used. EEC TREATY art. 189. Directives must be implemented through national law in each member state to be effective. For a detailed discussion of the EC's institutional
organization and legislative process, see AUDREY WINTER Er AL,EuROPe WmTHour FRoNTIERs: A LAwYER's GUIDE (BNA Corporate Practice Series, 1989). For a collection of EC legislation, see BLACKSTONE'S EEC LEGISLATION (Nigel G. Foster, ed., 1990).
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Two highly controversial proposals are currently before the Council,
the Fifth Company Law Directive (Fifth Directive) 3 and the Thirteenth
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeovers and Other General
Bids (Takeover Directive). 4 The Fifth Directive concerns the structure of
public limited companies, as well as their powers and obligations. This
Directive authorizes two distinct corporate structures, a unitary board
and a two-tier board. The Takeover Directive focuses on the tactics of
the bidder and target corporations during a takeover attempt. Each of
these proposed directives is examined here in terms of the importance
they place on the role of outside directors. This article will illustrate that
although both of these Directives embrace a monitoring role for company
directors, neither clearly defines what that role should be.
Examining the development of the monitoring obligations of outside
directors in the United States during the last quarter century offers important insight into the potential benefits and demands of a monitoring
role for outside directors in the EC. Part I of this article traces the evolution of outside directors' monitoring obligations in the United States.
This insight permits conclusions to be drawn in Part II about the overall
commitment which the Fifth Directive makes toward a meaningful monitoring role for directors. This analysis includes an examination of
whether the monitoring standards are the same for unitary boards as they
are for two-tier boards. The analysis of the United States journey toward
monitoring directors emphasizes the importance of each EC member
state's perception of the role of directors and precisely what interests they
are to serve when discharging their monitoring function. Part III presents
a close analysis of the Takeover Directive's treatment of defensive maneuvers and concludes that the Directive has vast lacunae in this area. The
3. Proposal for a Fifth Directive to Coordinate the Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the
Interests of Members and Others, Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty, as Regards the Structure of Socit6s
Anonymes and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 1972 O.J. (C 131) 49 [hereinafter Original Draft of the Fifth Directive]; Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g)

of the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obli.
gations of Their Organs, art. 4(b), 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2, 7-8 [hereinafter Amended Draft of the Fifth
Directive]; Second Amendment to the Commission Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs,
1991 O.J. (C 7) 4 [hereinafter Second Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive]. Minor changes to the
1983 proposal have been added. The 1991 amendment does not deal with the subject matter of this
article, but with voting rights. These directives will be collectively referred to in the text as the Fifth
Directive.
4. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8 [hereinafter Original Draft of the Takeover Directive];
Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover
and Other General Bids, 1990 O.J. (C 105) 6 [hereinafter Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive].
These Directives will be collectively referred to in the text as the Takeover Directive.
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argument is presented here that, in light of the emphasis in the United
States on the role of outside directors in takeovers, a similar emphasis
appears to be an appropriate manner to deal with the Takeover Directive's incomplete treatment of defensive maneuvers by target management. Part IV offers conclusions drawn from the foregoing analysis
concerning the overall benefits that can be derived from a comparative
analysis of company and takeover law reform proposals that are presently
before the EC.
I.

PERCEPTIONS INTO REALITY IN UNITED STATES
BOARDROOMS

There has been a dramatic change in the composition of the boardroom in the United States over the past two decades. Once a distinguishing characteristic of the United States boardroom was the extent to which
most directors were not financially independent of the corporation. Today, however, the prevailing practice is that outside directors occupy a
majority of the board's seats. 5 The change reflects the idea that the function of the board of directors is to monitor the managers' stewardship of
the firm. This belief contrasts sharply with the older view that the board
was a deliberative body of super-managers that developed grand policy
designs and supervised their execution by the full-time managers. 6 This
perception was inconsistent with outside directors having a meaningful
role because the inherent constraints on outside directors' time, as well as
the information reaching them, assure that they could never function as a
super-manager. In the late 1960s, the super-manager view began to give
way to a new consciousness that good corporate practice needed not new
managers but monitors of those that did manage. Those most capable of
monitoring were directors who were financially independent of the corporation and its officers. At the same time, there has been a recognition
that a critical mass of outside directors could provide much-needed discipline for the otherwise unsupervised managers.
The causes of these dramatic changes in the overall composition of
boards and the functions of outside directors is revealed by a review of
writings from the 1970s and 1980s on the role of corporate directors.
Leading authorities in both business and corporate law expressed alarm
5. HEIDRICK & STRu.GLEs, THE CHANGING BOARD 4 (1990) (reporting that 79% of surveyed

corporations had a majority of their board positions occupied by outside directors).
6. For example, the New York Business Corporation Law formerly provided that "the business
of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors .. " N.Y. Cox. LAw S 701 (McKinney
1963) (emphasis added). In 1977, the statute was amended to substitute "under the direction of" for
"by" to reflect the emerging view that directors are not necessarily managers, but are expected to
review those who are. See N.Y. CoRP. Aw 5 701 (McKinney 1986).
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over the absence of independence in the boardroom. 7 They condemned
the then prevalent view that directors were managers and questioned
whether they were instead "shut-eyed sentries." This cause for concern
was not simply a perception that shareholder interests were being poorly
served by the status quo. They voiced a broader concern that weakness in
corporate governance structures contributed to the directors' failure to
act in a socially responsible manner in areas ranging from product safety
to the environment. 9 The concerns found a rallying point in the 1970s
when the Watergate Special Prosecutor revealed that more than four hundred publicly traded corporations in the United States had engaged in
extensive bribery of foreign and domestic government officials.' 0 It is no
coincidence, therefore, that the government responded to these revelations by entering into settlements requiring corporations to clean their
own stables by empaneling a special investigatory committee comprised of
outside directors.1"
Those concerned with legal reform urged that outside directors were
not simply necessary, but that their role had to be something other than
as consultants to management.' 2 The leading commentator on this issue,
Professor Eisenberg, argued persuasively that one function outside directors can effectively serve is that of reviewing the stewardship of management and policing those transactions.' 3 This is especially true when
managers' interests have the potential to conflict with the interests of the
4
corporation and its shareholders."
7. See, e.g., MYLES L MACE, DIRECToRs: MYTH AND REALITY (1971). See also Donald Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence With Society, 60 GEo. ..
J.57 (1971); Arthur J.Goldberg,
Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1972, at Fl.
8. There have been concerns about sleeping directors for some time. See, eg., William 0.
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv.L REv. 1305 (1934). The best collection and review
of authorities on ineffectual directorial monitoring is John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry:
Towards a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099

(1977).
9. See, e.g., RALPH NADER Er AL,TAMNO THE GIANT CORPORATION 124-25 (1976); CHRISTOPHER
D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CoRPoRAT BEHAwoRt 152-83 (1975);

Alfred F. Conard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L REV. 941 (1977).
10. An illuminating review of this historical period for United States' corporations and a commentary in response to it appear in Deborah A. DeMott, Reweaving the CorporateVeil: Management
Structure and the Control of CorporateInformation, LAW & CornEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 182, 20720.
11. See JAMES D. Cox Er A.., SECUTIES REoULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 114 (1991).
12. See, eg., MEvIN ARON EISENBERO, THE SRucruRE OF THE CORPORATION 157 (1976).

13. Id. at 162-68.
14. Id. at 167. For example, consider the prevalent provision that conflict of interest transactions can be overcome through disinterested approval by the board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN.tit. 8, S 144(a)(1) (1983); N.Y. Cos'. LAw S713(a)(1) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT S 8.31(a)(1) (1984). Professor Eisenberg's vision is the backbone of the ongoing Corporate Governance Project of the American Law Institute. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Parts III
& I-A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991).
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Thus was born the aspiration that corporations in the United States
15
depart from the inside-board model in favor of the outside-board model.
Interestingly, this was a movement that found willing allies among chief
executive officers (CEOs). For example, business publications of the time
were filled with exhortations by managers to their fellow managers on the
virtues of an outside board. 16 But, as will be seen, merely impressing the
outside directors into service on the board does not alone assure a fully
independent view of management's stewardship.
A. Culture and Cohesion
The independence sought by the quest for outside directors may be
superficial. To be sure, the outside directors who predominate on the
boards of publicly traded corporations are not dependent upon the firm
or its officers for their livelihood. Their principal income is derived from
sources other than their boardroom fees. 17 But, their cultural and psychological identity is not much different from that of the managers they
are to oversee, and this can rob them of their independence.
The boardroom in the United States is primarily composed of
white, 18 wealthy, 19 Protestant, Republican 2 0 males21 with college educations.2 2 Indeed, the cultural identity among corporate directors is welldocumented.2 3 There is little that distinguishes the typical outside director from the firm's managers, whose stewardship the outside directors are
to monitor. This is evident from the fact that over ninety-three percent
of corporate directors are themselves captains of industry or the close advisors to those who are.2 4 Contributing to the cohesiveness of directors
among both inside and outside directors - is their sustained, intense
association with one another. Inside and outside directors join together
on a regular basis to share the common burdens and obligations of advancing the corporation's interests.2 5 This assures that they are col15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. Se4 e.g., End of the Directors Rubber Stamp, Bus. WK., Sept. 10, 1979, at 72; Paul B. Firstenberg & Burton G. Malkiel, Why Corporate Boards Need Independent Directors, MGMT. Rev., Apr.
1980, at 26; Lee Smith, The Boardroom Is Becoming a Different Scene, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 150.
17. HEIRICK & STRuooL.as, supra note 5, at 4.
18. Id. at 3.
19. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLEs, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982).
20. HeFDRuCK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1980).
21. HEiDRICK & STRuooLEs, THE CHANGINO BOARD 4 (1983).

22.
23.
THOMAS
24.

HEIDRICK & STRuGGLEs, supra note 19, at 8.
See eg., G. WILUAm DOMHOFF, WHO RuLEs AMEIucA Now?: A VIEW FOR THE '80s (1983);
R. DYE, WHo's RUNNING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
HEIDRICK & STRuGGLES, supra note 5, at 9.

25. A well-documented characteristic looked for when recruiting new board members is their
ability to work within the existing group of directors and share the managerial philosophy of the
company. See, eg., JE.REmy BACON & JAMEs K. BROwN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PACncES: ROLE,
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leagues in the truest sense of the expression. It is not surprising that
directors bring a unified view of the corporate interest to this task. Studies repeatedly document that the leading criterion for selecting a board
nominee is his probable identification with, and acceptance of, the company's goals and methods of operation. 26 Indeed, a director is expected
not only to work within the group's collective view of the corporate interest, but also to cooperate with other board members, whether or not they
are also managers, in reaching decisions by group consensus. 27 In the face
of psychological and sociological forces such as these, 28 serious questions
may be raised about how well-equipped the outside directors are to discharge their monitoring obligations.
Outside directors are also connected to the firm's CEO through the
active role that the CEO plays in making nominations to the board of
directors. Director nominations and decisions to renominate a sitting director generally occur through a process that is dominated by the CEO of
the corporation on whose board the nominee will serve. 29 Although directors must stand for election by the firm's stockholders, this ritual rarely
causes the director to incur any hostility and, generally, nomination foreordains the outside director's election. Therefore, the outside director
may feel disposed to the firm's CEO out of gratitude for his support in
obtaining membership to the board of directors.
The above image of the social and psychological forces that constrain
the outside directors' independence is not flattering. Those more cynical
than we may harbor suspicions whether the evolution to outside boards
was undertaken with the knowledge that mere changes in boardroom personnel would not introduce a revolution within the boardroom. Certainly, managers can more easily champion the need for outside directors
if the end result is that the overall dynamics within the boardroom remain
unchanged. This is especially true if the CEO is at the center of the deciSELEcnoN AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 29, 33 (1975). The shared task of board members is

inherent in this corporate structure whereby directorial tasks are carried out as a body, rather than as
independent actors. Cf. Hurley v. Ornsteen, 42 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1942) (holding that individual
approval by directors without meeting as a body does not constitute valid approval).
26. See, eg., BACON & BRoWN, supra note 25, at 30.
27. See, eg., MACE, supra note 7, at 97-101.
28. For an expanded analysis of the social and psychological forces that inhibit the outside director from being an aggressive monitor of management, see James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias
in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundationsand Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAw & CON
TEmp. PRoBs., Summer 1985, at 83.
. 29. In a significant percentage of nominating committees, the chief executive officer chairs the
nominating committee. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 19, at 4. Even when the nominating
committee is staffed entirely by outside directors, the chief executive officer is free to attend its meetings. John Perham, The Men Who Pick the Board, DUN'S REv., Dec. 1978, at 57-58. In any case, there
isample reason to suspect that new nominees are advanced only when they are believed to be acceptable to top management. See id.
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sion as to who serves on the board. As discussed earlier, the movement
toward an outside board was driven by historical events, such as Water30
gate, that reinforced society's concern over who watches management.
Because of the above described social and psychological forces, we believe
that society's perceptions of the outside director as a meaningful monitor
would have remained aspirational but for the changes in the legal culture
that are reviewed in the next section.
B. Historical Legal Context of Director Obligations
The monitoring obligation of outside directors is not a recent phenomenon. In the early case of Barnes v. Andrews, the court held that Andrews, an outside director whose tenure was less than nine months,
breached his duty to inform himself adequately about the newly created
company's operations. 31 Even though it raised a substantial amount of
capital through a public offering, possessed a well-equipped and staffed
factory, and produced enough parts for starter motors, the firm encountered dramatic delays in the assembly of those starter motors and the company ultimately failed. The court held that Andrews breached his duty by
failing to inform himself adequately about the firm's performance and position. There was no evidence that Andrews made even a minimal inquiry of the company's performance or financial position. 32 The holding
in Barnes is sharpened by the absence of any facts or circumstances known
to Andrews imparting reasonable notice to him that the firm was experiencing problems. The duty imposed by Barnes, therefore, is more stringent than the typical case in which the director has failed to heed
warnings that would prompt a reasonable director to act. 33 Moreover,

Barnes is more demanding than those cases punishing directors who are
34
habitually absent from board meetings.
Today's concerns for the monitoring director involve problems far
more subtle than those involved in Barnes. The modern trend is to focus
upon the extent of an outside director's obligation to militate the company's violation of federal and state laws against pollution, employment
discrimination, bribery, unfair competition, and the like, rather than
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (2d Cir. 1924).
32. Id. at 615-16.
33. In the leading case of Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920), Justice Holmes held that a
teller's flashy lifestyle should have prompted the bank's president to inquire whether shrinkages in
the bank's deposits were the result of the teller's embezzlements. Id. at 530. The bank's directors,
however, not being similarly on notice, were held not to have breached their fiduciary duties. Id. at

529.
34. See Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 513 (1919) (holding that a director who had not
attended board meetings for five years had breached his duty to inform himself).
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upon why the firm failed during an outside director's watch. On questions such as these, the burden of inquiry is far more encompassing than
that which Barnes imposed upon directors.
An important decision in the development of outside directors' monitoring duties is the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Al.

lis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company.35 In Allis-Chalmers, a derivative suit
was brought against the company's directors to recover damages the company suffered because its employees engaged in massive bid rigging with
competitors, a flagrant violation of United States antitrust laws. 36 One
theory of the plaintiff's action was that the directors had acted unreasonably in failing to establish a system to detect and prevent antitrust violations by company employees. 3 7 The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed
the action, reasoning that since Allis-Chalmers was a large multinational
company with over 30,000 employees, it was unreasonable to consider
that the directors would undertake an active investigation of each division
of the firm. The court held that the directors acted reasonably in relying
upon the reports and summaries of operations which they had no reason
to believe untrustworthy. 38 More importantly, the court believed the directors had no responsibility to establish and maintain a system of surveil39
lance unless there was suspicion of wrongdoing.
If the board is perceived as a body of super-managers rather than
monitors of those that do manage, the reasoning in Allis-Chalmers is more
understandable. As a manager and policymaker, delegation is not only
desirable, but essential. Any other approach is not practical in light of
the limits on the outside directors' time and information. But upon acknowledging that the role of outside directors is that of monitoring the
managers' stewardship of the firm, concern arises whether Allis-Chalmers
continues to be good authority. For example, Allis-Chalmers reasoning is
inconsistent with the more recent decision in Francis v. United Jersey
Bank,40 where the court refused to allow a director to use ignorance as an
excuse, the very defense upheld in Allis-Chalmers. The Francis court
stated:
Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed
about the activities of the corporation.... Directors may not shut their
35. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
36. Id. at 127.
37. This theory found support in the fact that 19 years earlier, Allis-Chalmers had entered into
two consent decrees with government regulators settling claims of price fixing. Id. at 129-30. The
plaintiff also argued that the consent decrees put the current board members on notice so that they
had a duty "to ferret out such activity and to take active steps to insure that it would not be repeated." Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 130.
39. Id.
40. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (NJ. 1981).
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eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because they did not

see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look. The sentinel
asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to
protect.
Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of
day-to-day activities,
but rather a general monitoring of corporate af41
fairs and policies.
The difference between AUis-Chalmers and Francis is their placement
in time.42 Francis emerged after the role of the outside director changed
from that of an active manager to that of an active monitor. Moreover,
since Allis-Chalmers, a solid perception has developed that the public corporation's board of directors should design and implement legal compli43
ance systems such as those argued for by the plaintiff in Allis-Chalmers.
Because the content of the law is informed by prevailing practices, there
are ample grounds to believe that the Allis-Chalmers board would today
be pressed to justify the absence of any compliance procedures, 44 especially in view of the fact that the prevailing legal climate emphasizes the
45
monitoring function of outside directors.
Any doubt about the role in which the Delaware Supreme Court has
cast for the outside director is removed by its landmark decision in Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 4 6 where the court held the outside directors breached
their duty of care in approving the sale of Trans Union Corporation.
The sale was approved by the board of directors at a meeting that lasted
only two hours. The presentation was completely oral, no written drafts
41. Id. at 822 (citations omitted).
42. Two leading Delaware practitioners have persuasively reasoned that Allis.Chalmers would be
decided differently today because of the changed perspective of the role of outside directors. See E.
Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, CodiiedStandard- Safe Harboror UnchartedReel?. An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919 (1980).
43. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1595, 1610 (1978); American Bar Association, Section
on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the
Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2101 (1978).
44. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 42, at 930. But see Rodman Ward, Jr., Fiduciary Standards
Applicable to Officers and Directors and the Business Judgment Rule Under Delaware Law, 3 Da. J. CoRP.
L 244, 246-47 (1977-78) (reasoning that the decision to install compliance procedures is akin to an
economic decision depending primarily upon the level of notice and risk of harm). This reasoning
appears to overlook the cases such as Barnes and Francis that found a breach of the director's duty
even though the director was not on inquiry notice.
45. This does not mean, however, that the directors in either Allis-Chalmers or Bates would be
liable today for their subordinate's misbehavior. Even reasonably designed and superintended compliance programs will not detect or deter all misbehavior. The directors' technical breach in failing to
install such a system may ultimately bear no causal relationship with the harm caused by the
subordinate's wrongdoing. Even though Andrews breached his duty to inform himself, the court
ultimately held he was not liable because there was no evidence that, had he inquired, he could have
prevented the company's failure. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (2d Cit. 1924).
46. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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of the agreement were circulated, and Van Gorkom did not disclose that
the $55 sales price reflected the price Trans Union's own cash flow would
justify if the purchase was a management buyout.4 7 The board's approval
can best be described as an uncritical acceptance of senior management's
recommendations.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors failed to inform themselves adequately and therefore acted with gross negligence in
approving Trans Union's sale. 48 The court chastised the directors for failing to inquire how the sales price was determined and for failing to inform themselves of the intrinsic value of the firm. 49 The Delaware
Supreme Court established that monitoring requires, at a minimum, an
aggressive probing of management's reasons for supporting a proposal
submitted to the board.
With the decision in Van Gorkom, the aspirations for monitoring directors that produced the movement toward outside boards of directors
became fused into the directors' duty of care. Van Gorkom is a watershed
decision representing far more than the most important corporate law
court in the United States holding that directors breached their duty of
care when they agreed to sell the corporation at a significant premium. Its
call for the diligent pursuit of options and information, rather than reliance upon the recommendations of a trusted executive, underscores the
independence that is the keystone of the monitoring role. The duty that
Delaware and other courts impose upon the outside directors continues
to grow, especially with respect to the pivotal role that they play in contests for corporate control.
C.

Strain and Growth in the Duty to Monitor

Takeover targets are not without weapons for their own defense. Indeed, it is the creativity and resourcefulness of skillful takeover lawyers
who undertake to equip the target board with a defensive arsenal that
puts an independent director's monitoring role to its greatest test. The
outside director may well be conflicted when the firm is the target of a
takeover. Certainly when there is a hostile bid for the firm, natural psychological forces do not drive outside directors from their managers' side.
The prior associations, shared experiences and aspirations for the firm,
and continuing nonpecuniary awards if the firm remains independent,
may well combine to cause outside directors to regard the bid as a threat.
Not surprisingly, the board's response frequently is to assume a siege
mentality in the face of a hostile takeover. The initiation of an outside
47. Id. at 874.
48. Id.

49. Id-

Winter 1992]

MONITORING DUTIES

bid repeatedly results in a "we-they" attitude between the incumbent directors and the unwanted suitor.
The most significant jurisprudence on these questions is that of the
Delaware Supreme Court. Certainly this is so in terms of molding the
outside directors' performance to the prevailing perception that they are
the monitors of the managers. The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. ,5o held that the board of directors has the
burden of proving that it acted in good faith and only after reasonable
investigation when initiating a defensive maneuver. Importantly, Unocal
also imposes the demanding requirement that the defensive maneuver
"must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed" 5 1 by the outside
bidder or its bid.
By placing the burden of proof upon the directors to establish their
good faith and the reasonableness of their investigation, and by requiring
that the defensive maneuver not be disproportionate to the threat imposed, the Delaware Supreme Court dramatically changed the areas of
inquiry in takeover contests. No longer is it permissible for the target
board to "wage war at any price" once they have isolated a difference in
business policy or practices between the incumbent board and the
suitor. 52 Also, the directors no longer enter the legal fray with a heady
presumption of infallibility - they have the burden of persuasion under
Unocal.53
This long step in evolving doctrine is based on the courts' awareness
that contests for control present managers and outside directors with inherent conflicts of interest.5 4 Given such conflict, takeover defensive ma50. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
51. Id. at 955. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has imposed a more

rigorous standard of requiring an independent, nontakeover-driven basis to justify defensive maneuvers
in which the target corporation transferred shares to its wholly owned subsidiary and a smaller block
of shares to a newly created employee stock ownership plan. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
52. Contra Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 551-52 (Del. 1964) (allowing sweeping defensive
maneuvers where the board learned, after a very scanty investigation, that the bidder would change
the target's marketing practices, had liquidated several companies that he controlled, and may not

have been successful in managing companies he previously acquired).
53. Commentators frequently emphasize the important presumptions concerning the propriety
of director decisions in normal business transactions. See S. Samuel Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilitiesof
Directors Officers and Key Employees, 4 DE.L J. Cou. L.652, 660-64 (1979); S.Samuel Arsht & Joseph
Hinsey IV, Codified Standard-SameHarbor but Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAw. 947, 95861 (1980); Veasey & Manning, supra note 42, at 930-42. See also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in theIndemnoication of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Ya LIJ.
1078, 1099-1100 (1968) (finding just four cases where liability was imposed on directors of industrial
corporations for mere negligence uncomplicated by self-interest).
54. Specifically, a conflict naturally arises in the takeover context between the traditional role of
directors as defenders of the corporation and the role of outside directors as auctioneers. See infra
note 60 and accompanying text.
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neuvers should not enjoy the presumption of propriety and deference
that attends other decisions exercised by the board of directors. Rather
than rendering the board totally incapable, Delaware has chosen the intermediate position of altering the burden in justifying the board's actions
and placing great emphasis on the role and actions of the outside directors. In effect, courts in the United States have determined that outside
directors can and should play an important part in refereeing contests for
control.
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. ,5 the court reasoned that the outside directors have a special function to serve when
asked by self-interested management to adopt a defensive maneuver. The
court suggested that the outside directors must take some steps to independently assure that the proposed transaction is fair. 56 In the process,
the court suggested that outside directors should distance themselves
f-rom management by securing their own advisors and positioning themselves as an independent negotiating committee to deal with their managers.5 7 At a minimum, Hanson Trust requires outside directors to disabuse
themselves of thinking that the interests of outside directors and stockholders are identical to those of managers. In short, monitoring requires
the outside directors to assume a more adversarial role vis-a'-vis the firm's
managers.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,58 Delaware added an important second dimension to the monitoring role of outside
directors in contests for control by holding that at some point outside
directors must cast aside their defensive aspirations5 9 and assume an entirely new role, that of a proactive auctioneer of the firm.60 In June, 1985,
Pantry Pride, after its casual merger proposal to Revlon's board was rebuffed, launched a hostile tender offer. Pantry Pride commenced its bid at
$47.50, increased it to $50 and, on October 7, raised it again to $56.25.
Revlon responded by enticing Forstmann, Little & Co. (Forstmann) to
also bid for Revlon. 6 1 On October 12, Forstmann raised its bid to $57.25
per share conditioned, among other matters, upon the Revlon board
granting Forstmann the option to purchase its Vision Care and National
Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million, approximately $100-$175
55. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 276.
57. Id. at 277.
58. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
59. As previously discussed, the Unocal standard regulates the propriety of defensive maneuvers.
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
61. Id. at 177.
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million below their appraised value. 62 Rather than focusing upon the
process by which Revlon's board determined the price at which to option
these two divisions, the court challenged the board's ability at this stage of
the contest to engage in any defensive maneuver:
[W]hen Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50 per share, and then to
$53, it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was
inevitable.... The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This significantly
altered the board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards.... The
directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with63getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.
The decisions in Unocal and Revlon are the dominant authorities in
the United States when judging the propriety of director behavior in the
context of a takeover. 64 After a good deal of refinement in subsequent
decisions, Revlon can be reconciled with Unocal. Even though Revlon dictates when certain actions to defend control are prohibited, directors may
still engage in steps that prefer one bidder over another, which, in other
contexts, would be viewed as a defensive maneuver. 65 Such steps, even
though taken when the directors are subject to Revlon's auction duty, are
judged by the enhanced standards of Unocal.66 More significantly, later
cases have shown that Unocal's proportionality requirement does not entail a delicate balancing of the danger embodied in the suitor's bid against
the relative height of the obstacle which the particular defensive maneuver places in the suitor's path. For example, in the famous case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. ,67 the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld as proportional Time's acquisition of Warner Communications.
Time's board of directors changed its acquisition of Warner from a stock
to a cash transaction in order to avoid having to obtain shareholder approval. Such approval would almost certainly not have been forthcoming
because Paramount was offering a much greater price than the expected
value of the Time shares following its acquisition of Warner. In upholding Time's switch from stock to cash, the court reasoned that the response was proportional if it did not preclude the company's takeover. 68
62. Id. at 178.
63. Id. at 182.
64. See, eg., Cottle v. Stoerer Communications, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (lth Cit. 1988);
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986); NCR Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 761 F. Supp. 474, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

65.
66.
67.
68.

See, eg., In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 782 (Del. 1988).
See, eg., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1988).
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 1150-51.
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The court observed that, even though the Time-Warner acquisition created a much larger company that would be more difficult to acquire, their
combination did not preclude acquisition by Paramount. 69 Because few
defensive maneuvers are preclusive, Unocal's ultimate contribution must
be seen as its emphasis on the necessity for good faith and reasonable
investigation, and especially the role of outside directors in meeting each
70
of these requirements.
Thus, the response to defensive maneuvers in the United States is
guided by two leading cases, Unocal and Revlon. 7 1 Rather than offering
crisp standards, each decision embraces a broader notion of the monitoring role of directors such that the pivotal concerns under both Unocal
and Revlon are the actions of the outside directors. Absent proof that the
outside directors acted in a truly independent fashion and with adequate
information, the takeover defense fails. Upon a finding that the outside
directors acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation, the defensive maneuver, even if undertaken when the company is in the Revlon
mode, 72 is valid.7 3 Even though outside directors are not natural allies to
the notion that the bids of outsiders should be dispassionately regarded
or that such directors should eschew the advice of managers when the
firm is under siege, the courts have announced standards that cast outside
directors in this role. Certainly, takeover defenses and management
buyouts have struck many as becoming increasingly out of control so that
some change in judicial attitudes in response to these phenomena was not
unexpected. What is significant is that the courts have chosen the outside
directors to shoulder the burden of protecting stockholders' interests.

69. Id. at 1151.
70. See4 eg., Mills, 559 A.2d at 1287.

71. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
A related inquiry pertains to the standard that directors must satisfy when impeding stockholders from convening a meeting concerning directors' control. In a path-breaking decision, Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988), the court held that directors in
such situations must establish a compelling justification for staggering the elections of the board of
directors so as to frustrate the shareholders from obtaining a majority of the board seats. But see
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (deferral of date of stockholders'
meeting in face of a suitor's expressed intent to conduct proxy contest in order to acquire control
held to be beyond Blasius because it did not preclude ultimate shareholder action).
72. See, eg., Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989).
73. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66-68 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987). Unoca! has even been extended to permit courts to judge the impropriety when directors support a takeover bid they previously opposed. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144-45 (Del. 1990) (directors suddenly
supported takeover bid allegedly based upon the suitor's offer of terms more beneficial to some of the
directors than those originally offered).
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The outside director's role is frequently a proactive one that is consistent
74
with that of monitoring managers.
D.

Message from the United States Experience

The revolution within the United States boardrooms that began
over a quarter of a century ago is still occurring. The forces for structural
changes came neither from sweeping statutory commands nor judicial decisions. Although there were statutory commands and judicial decisions
that molded the monitoring role of directors, these regulatory changes
built upon the collective view of those in business, government, and
academia that we must discard the predominance of the inside board and
replace it with substantial monitoring obligations for outside directors.
The perception of the monitoring director would still be aspirational
without the landmark decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.75 The Delaware
Supreme Court's sweeping condemnation of the outside directors' deference to the recommendations of management in Van Gorkom left no
doubt that outside directors would be held to the standards that society
believes they are capable of performing. Thereafter, in decisions such as
Unocal and Revlon, the courts repeatedly place the outside director in a
central role of protecting corporate and shareholder interests, so that it
can now be said that the most significant state law protections of the
shareholder interest are designed around the evolving obligations of
outside directors. Clearly, no question of managerial prerogatives or
shareholder interests is examined today without giving the outside directors' role dispositive weight.
74. In 1986, the Delaware legislature amended its General Corporation Law to allow the charters of Delaware corporations to include provisions that limit director liability for damages arising
from a breach of their duty of care. See DE. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 102(b)(7) (1990). Since Delaware
enacted its statute, a number of other states have enacted similar statutory provisions. See generally
Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. LQ. 295, 297-310 (1988). The impetus
for such legislative activity is provided by both the decisions that subject outside directors' judgments
to closer scrutiny, such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and difficulties in obtaining adequate liability insurance. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors'and Of.
ficers' Liability Insurance?, 14 D..J. CoR'. L 1 (1989). The effect of such charter provisions is to focus
attention upon the transaction itself through the medium of a prayer for injunctive relief, rather than
the personal liability of the directors. While appearing to be a major retreat from directors' responsibilities, the irony of charter provisions such as Delaware's is that they may actually stimulate an
increase in the amount of litigation that questions director judgments. Such an approach allows
courts to proceed with scrutiny of a certain transaction without fear that their remedy may be draconian to the individual director. Furthermore, the elimination of damage recoveries does not erase the
incentive for care-based suits. In the U.S., where contingency suits are the preferred medium for
enforcing officer and director obligations, recovery of plaintiff's attorneys' fees may be conferred if
the suit successfully establishes bad faith on the part of the directors. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio
Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Del. 1989). The result, therefore, may be that plaintiffs will actually
benefit most from charter provisions that limit directorial liability.
75. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
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What appears most clear in the case of the evolving duties of outside
directors is that perception has preceded changes in the law. Such an
evolution is not new to the law. It has long been the view of legal historians that doctrine is neither rigid nor immune to changes within society.
It must be remembered that the first step in the evolution of the monitoring duty was placing outside directors on the board, and doing so in significant numbers. This occurred because it was perceived as being good
business practice to have an outside board. In the aftermath of this development, the common law has continued to complete its prescription of
the outside directors' responsibilities by imposing obligations consistent
with a monitoring role. Thus, the demands on outside directors in the
United States are not dependent upon precise statutory commands, but
upon more general societal forces.
Additionally, the role that representative suits play should not be
overlooked. 76 Representative suits not only produce decisions that embody standards of conduct, but more significantly provide the "bully pulpit" from which to exhort outside directors to conform their conduct to
society's aspirations. Van Gorkom, by condemning the Trans Union directors' passivity, touched all outside directors in the United States with
its holding.
The next section examines the fabric of the Fifth and Takeover Directives for evidence of the EC's commitment to the monitoring role of
outside directors. The question of whether these directives embrace a
monitoring role for outside directors is examined. It is our thesis that, if
there is evidence showing a meaningful monitoring standard for outside
directors in the Fifth Directive, this command must rest upon a widely
held perception within the EC that monitors are needed and that the
outside directors should fulfill this role.
II.

THE FIFTH DIRECTIVE'S UNITARY BOARD
AND TWO-TIER SYSTEM

As first proposed in 1972, the Fifth Directive adopted exclusively the
two-tier board system in which all companies were to have both a management board and a supervisory board. 77 As initially proposed, the Fifth
Directive sought to achieve the twin objectives of independent monitoring of company management and employee participation in company decision making. This was to be accomplished through a supervisory board
composed entirely of nonmanagement outside directors and employee
76. Representative suits are brought by shareholders for individual injury rather than injury to
the corporation. For case law dealing with the distinction between representative and derivative suits,
see Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1971).
77. Original Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, ch. II.
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representatives. 78 The management board is responsible for implementing the company's goals and policies on a day-to-day basis. The supervisory board selects and removes management and has overall responsibility
for supervising management's stewardship. 79 The supervisory board is

constituted to assure its sensitivity to the interests of owners and workers
and thereby to have the resolve to discharge its supervisory functions.8 0
Due to a lack of experience with the two-tier board in the member states
(other than The Netherlands and Germany where it is mandatory),' the
original draft of the Fifth Directive met with strong resistance, particu2
larly from the Community's then newest member, the United Kingdom.
After heated discussion and protracted negotiations within the European
Parliament,8 3 an Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive was proposed in
1983 which expands the structural options for corporations to include a
unitary board.8 4 The Amended Draft also allows a less radical medium
5
for employee participation in company decision making.
78. Id. Under the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, employee representatives are selected
in either of two ways. Under the German model, employees could directly elect between one-third
and one-half of the supervisory board. See Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art.
4(b). Alternatively, under the so-called Dutch model, the supervisory board co-opts its own membership. However, objections to a supervisory board appointment can be made by the general meeting,
by a committee of shareholders selected by the general meeting, or by representatives of the employees. Such objections must challenge proposed candidates on the grounds that they are unable to carry
out their duties or would cause the board to be improperly constituted. See id.art. 4(c).
79. See id.
80. See Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the"Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80
HARv. L. Rav. 23, 50-53 (1966).
81. On a voluntary basis, a two-tier system can be established in France. ROBERT R. PENNINOTON
& FRANK WOOLEIDGE, CoMPANY LAW INTHE EuRoPEAN COMMuNmES 51 (3d ed. 1982). Even though
two boards are mandatory in Denmark, there is no clear separation between the duties of the two. Id.
at 181.
82. For comments from the viewpoint of Irish and British law on the Original Draft of the Fifth
Directive, see J.Temple Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law, 12 CoMMON MKr.L Ray. 155 (1975). For the British viewpoint on the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, see Janet Dine, Implicationsfor theUnited Kingdom of the EC Fifth Directive, 38 INT'L & COMp. L.Q.
547 (1989).
83. See Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the European Parliament on the Proposal from
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Fifth Directive to Coordinate
the Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, Are Required by
Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the EEC
Treaty, as Regards the Structure of Soci&r6s Anonymes and the Powers and Obligations of Their
Organs, 1982 O.J. (C 149) 17.
84. See Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art. 2.
85. See k, chs. III-IV. It should be noted that the proposed European Company Statute also
includes both the two-tier and the one-tier system. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute
for a European Company, arts. 62-67, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, 54-55 [hereinafter European Company
Statute]. The rules in the European Company Statute are less detailed compared to the Amended
Draft of the Fifth Directive. Employee participation in a European company is regulated separately in
the Proposal for a Council Directive Complementing the Statute for a European Company with
Regard to the Involvement of Employees in the European Company, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69. By this
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The two draft directives utilize different means for accomplishing the
objectives of monitoring of managers and employee participation in decision making. As originally proposed, two distinct bodies were required: a
management board and a supervisory board. A significant and direct employee voice was assured through membership on the supervisory board
wher no fewer than one third of the supervisors were identified with the
employees' interests.8 6 Under the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive,
a unitary system is allowed, which permits the possibility that no seats on
the board of directors will be set aside for representatives of labor. 87
Allowance of a unitary board substantially weakens the codetermination component. Overall, the effect of these changes may be seen, at least
from a purely structural perspective, as merely embracing the status quo. 88
Those few countries where the two-tier system prevails can continue this
corporate structure while their fellow member states may continue to operate with a unitary board. Employee representation in corporations
utilizing the unitary board system can be provided by election of certain
nonexecutive members to the board. The unitary board parallels the governance structure of public corporations in the United States such that it
invites inquiry as to whether the monitoring duties of the nonexecutive
members of the unitary board will rival those of their counterparts in the
United States. It also raises the issue of whether the nonexecutive unitary
board members' resolve to monitor is less acute than that of the members
of the supervisory board in the two-tier system. The following analysis
addresses these questions by exploring further whether the monitoring
task is purely a function of structure, or whether, as discussed in Part I,
separation, it may be possible to agree upon and enact the European Company Statute without deciding the controversial issue of employee participation which faces opposition, especially in the U.K.
For a discussion of British criticisms of the employee participation plan embodied in the Original
Draft of the Fifth Directive, see Dine, supra note 82, at 555-56.
86. Original Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art. 4(b). For the view that codetermina-

tion results in greater efficiency and that backing off from codetermination is therefore unwise, see
Clark D. Stith, Federalismand Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European Community, 79
GEo. LJ. 1581, 1591-92 (1991). But, for overall praise for the EC taking an approach that reduces a
race to the bottom in contrast to the lack of uniformity in corporate laws in the United States, see
Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to UnUformity in Corporation Laws, 89 MiCH. L. REv. 2150

(1991).
87. Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art. 2. Employee participation can be
provided for in a collective agreement between the company and the employees' representative. Id.,
arts. 4(e), 21(f). Otherwise, employee participation on a unitary board occurs through direct election
of between one-third and one-half of the board's members, id. art. 21(d), or through a consultative
council. Id. arts. 4(d), 21(e). An excellent analysis of the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive's
treatment of codetermination appears in Jane Welch, The Fifth Draft Directive - A False Dawn?, 8

EuR. L. REv. 83 (1983).
88. For a view critical of the compromises embodied in the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, see Dine, supra note 82.
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the precise duties and rigor of monitoring is shaped by a society's perception of what directors ought to do.
A. The Monitoring Function of Nonexecutive Directors
A question that has been posed is whether the Amended Draft of
the Fifth Directive not only dilutes the objective of codetermination, but
also weakens the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors.8 9 On
closer analysis, it appears that the role with respect to monitoring by the
supervisory board directors mandated by the Fifth Directive is identical to
that of nonexecutive directors of the unitary board. 90 Like supervisory
board directors, each set of nonexecutive directors enjoys absolute veto
power over closure, transfer, extension, or curtailment of a substantial
part of the business, as well as -a veto over any substantial organizational
changes or long-term cooperative undertakings. 91 Moreover, the roles of
supervisory board members and of nonexecutive unitary board members
92
are both defined as that of supervising management.
Some may argue that these similar provisions are somewhat hollow
since more important structural differences can be expected to cripple the
nonexecutive members of the unitary board from discharging their monitoring function with the detachment and commitment of their supervisory board counterparts. It should be remembered that the nonexecutive
members of the unitary board are co-participants in the formulation of all
significant business decisions. As such, their involvement transcends the
bare exercise of a veto and includes a proactive decision making role
shared with the executive members of the board. Once established, such
joint participation does not encourage detachment in monitoring business policies or decisions. 93 That is, the nonexecutive members of the
unitary board are very much involved in corporate decision making and
can be expected to view the executive members as their colleagues and
identify with the executive actions. Their position is quite different from
that of directors who serve on the supervisory board in the two-tier system, a system which does not entail such continuous interaction but
rather permits periodic intervention. Indeed, there is little substantive
89. See, e.g., Welch, supra note 87, at 99-100.
90. The two-tier system of the European Company Statute prescribes that "[t]he supervisory
board may not participate in the management." European Company Statute, supra note 85, art.
63(1). Under the one-tier system, "[tihe management ... shall be delegated by the administrative
board to one or more of it [sic] members. The executive members shall be fewer in number than the
other members of the board." Id. art. 66(2).
91. Original Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art. 12; Amended Draft of the Fifth
Directive, supra note 3, art. 21(s).
92. Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, arts. 3(1)(a), 21(a)(1)(a).
93. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 28, at 99-104.
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difference between nonexecutive members of the unitary board and the
94
functions of members of the management board of the two-tier system.
Whereas, under the two-tier system, members of the supervisory board
are not identified with the decision or policy in question, so there is every
reason to expect that the supervisory board's members will exhibit greater
detachment when called upon to review those transactions requiring their
approval. A further factor that contributes to the supervisory board's
greater detachment is that a significant portion of the supervisory board's
composition is identified with labor, an interest that, at least historically,
is antagonistic to management. In contrast, there is no such identifiable
constituency to whom the nonexecutive unitary board directors are accountable 95 because employee representation is not assured on the unitary board. 96 Finally, there is the reality that nonexecutive unitary board
members most likely will themselves be captains of industry and, as such,
can be expected to be sympathetic to the views and positions of the company's executive personnel. 97 In combination, it would appear that members of the supervisory board in a two-tier system, from a structural
perspective, are more likely to monitor managers than the nonexecutive
members of a unitary board.
B.

The Supervisory Board Under a Microscope

These observations may well overstate the presumed independence
of the nonexecutive, nonemployee members of the supervisory board of
the two-tier system. This group is most likely to supervise aggressively the
managers in a company whose holdings are concentrated within a small
group of stockholders. Where ownership is diffuse, the complaint against
the supervisory board has been that it is too dependent upon management for information and too removed from operations to serve as knowledgeable and committed monitors of the managers. 98 It is no wonder,
therefore, that the supervisory board's ability to fulfill its mission as a
watchdog of management has long been doubted. 99 In fact, it is far more
94. Daniel T. Murphy, The Amended Proposalfor a Fifth Company Law Directive: Nihil Novum, 7
Hous. J. rr'iL L 215, 231 (1985).
95. Having outside directors accountable to a distinct subset of owners or an intermediary has

recently been suggested as a positive step toward improving the overall governance of the United
States' corporation. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L REv. 863, 890-91 (1991).
96. There is a limited role for codetermination in that it makes a vague allowance for some
medium of worker involvement to be established through collective bargaining. See Amended Draft
of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, ch. IV.
97. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 28, at 105-08.
98. See Vagts, supra note 80, at 52.
99. See id. at 52-53. A close analysis of the many factors that have nevertheless allowed the bank
dominated supervisory board in Germany to nurture stability and long-range planning appears in
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reasonable to conclude that nonexecutive members who share policymaking responsibilities with full-time managers on a unitary board are more
likely to have greater experience and insight into the company than the
members of the supervisory board whose task is to evaluate such decisions
after their implementation by the management board.
Indeed, the existence of a supervisory board can be seen as addressing the weaknesses in local reporting requirements, not merely problems
relating to a monitoring function or fulfilling a social agenda of worker
coordination. The supervisory board flourishes in those countries that
lack the highly developed independent reporting function and concomitant disclosure system that so distinguishes public corporations in the
United States." °° In light of the supervisory board's special mission to
report to the stockholders under the Fifth Directive, and the different
reporting obligations of the nonexecutive directors on the unitary
board, 10 1 it can be seen that perhaps the most significant distinction between the unitary and the two-tier paradigms advanced in the Fifth Directive lies in their respective approaches toward periodic disclosure. Under
both the two-tier and unitary boards, nonexecutive directors enjoy the
same rights to information and are empowered to carry out investigations
of management as they wish.102 On the other hand, the nonexecutive
directors of the unitary board are bound by the same duty of confidentiality as their executive counterparts.10 3 Thus, they do not enjoy absolute
freedom to share their information with the stockholders at a general
meeting. Nor are nonexecutive directors under a duty to do so, as are the
members of the management board in the two-tier system. 10 4 Thus,
under a unitary system, it may be difficult for the nonexecutive members
of a unitary board to curtail the errant ways of managers through the
threat of ventilating concerns of management's behavior before the
stockholders.
C.

Social Perception of the Nonexecutive Directors' Functions

If weaknesses in reporting requirements are the source for the
slightly different obligations and rights of the supervisory board's nonexecutive directors, these are differences that are likely to matter only in the
extreme circumstances where the nonexecutive directors must consider a
direct challenge to management. In such a case, those serving on a superRichard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1991).
100. Id at 59-60.
101. Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, arts. 32, 60.
102. See id arts. 11, 21(r).
103. Id art. 21(g).
104. Id art. 31.
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visory board have greater freedom to use confidential information than
do the nonexecutive directors of a unitary board. In all other situations,
the differences between the two-tier and unitary boards are not significant
in terms of their impact on the role of the nonexecutive directors. As
discussed in connection with the evolution of the director as a monitor of
management in the United States, the most important factor has been the
widely held view that the outside directors are not merely participants in
the formulation of corporate strategies, but, more significantly, are
monitors of management's stewardship.10 5 This role is as finely articulated in the amended draft of the Fifth Directive for the unitary board as
it is for the two-tier board. Without question, the expansion of the range
of permissible options in the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive to
include the unitary board is due to serious divisions within the EC on the6
0
formalization of employee participation in company decision making.'
The role of nonexecutive and supervisory board directors as monitors is
the same. This point is emphasized in Article 21(a), which states that
"[tihe company shall be managed by the executive members.., under the
supervision of the nonexecutive members .... 1 0o7 The supreme role of
the nonexecutive members is underscored in Article 21(t), which authorizes a majority of the nonexecutive members to dismiss an executive
member.10 8 Finally, the preamble to the Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive states that one-tier systems may be maintained if the nonexecutive
members of their unitary boards are "endowed with ... characteristics
designed to harmonize their functioning with that of the two-tier structures."10 9 Hence, it is the objective of granting employee participation in
company decision making that has been diluted in the amended draft and
not the felt necessity or the structure for nonexecutive directors to discharge a monitoring role.1 10 In view of the force with which the amended
draft of the Fifth Directive advances the monitoring role for nonexecutive
directors, it would appear that the experience in the United States, discussed above, can be expected to provide acute insights into the obligations of EC company directors under the Fifth Directive. However, the
interest protected may be quite different.
105. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. See PENNINOTON & WOOUUDGE, supra note 81; Dine, supra note 82; Lang, supra note 82.
107. Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, art. 21(a).
108. Id. art. 21(t).
109. Id. pmbl.
110. It should be further observed that the Fifth Directive does not itself articulate a standard of
care and skill for board members. Of course, board members are jointly and severally liable for losses
proximately suffered by a company as a consequence of the directors' wrongful acts committed in the
course of performing their duties. In addition, board members may exonerate themselves from liability by proving that no fault is attributable to them personally. See id. arts. 14(l)-(2), 21(u).
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As was seen, the dominant force shaping the contours of the outside
directors' duty to monitor under United States law was not the structural
component of that legal paradigm but the overall perception of what
outside directors can and should do. There is every reason to believe that
the monitoring role of the nonexecutive directors of EC corporations will,
over time, also respond to local aspirations. However, it is not likely that
these aspirations will either duplicate those in the United States or be
equal among all twelve member states.
To illustrate, consider how different social attitudes toward plant
closings and worker dislocation can affect the content of the monitoring
duty. A clear difference exists between the United States and the EC on
the question of plant closings. There is abundant evidence within the EC
of a grave reluctance to embrace decisions or norms that make it more
likely that plants will be closed, relocated, or that would otherwise cause
broad disruption to workers' routines."' In contrast, plant closures have
become frequent in the United States, and efforts to adopt the European
approach have been largely unsuccessful." 2 To be sure, so-called constituency statutes' 1 3 have been enacted in more than half of the states in the
United States and they may superficially appear to protect workers, communities, and tax bases from the ill-effects of those takeovers that could
result in the closure of marginal operations." 4 However, the analogy to
European attitudes on such questions is not a strong one because constituency statutes do not compel managers to consider the effects of closures
on local nonshareholder interests; the statutes merely permit these interests to be considered if the directors desire. Constituency statutes in the
United States do not embody the same societal commitment to plant closings that exists in Europe. It is therefore reasonable to believe that while
the manner in which European nonexecutive directors discharge their
monitoring task will not be different from the practices of their counterparts in the United States, the interests they will be asked to serve are
broader than those required in the United States. This, in turn, will demand that a greater range of information be considered when corporate
decisions affect ongoing relationships with workers. The monitoring task
I11.

See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us?, HAuv. Bus. REv., Jan-Feb. 1990, at 53.
112. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L REv. 1189 (1991). See generally Joseph William
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 SAN. L. Ray. 611 (1988).
113. See Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying CorporateDirectors' Responsibilities under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 PA. L. REv. 1451 (1990).
See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 271B. 12-210 (Baldwin 1991).
114. Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus.

LAw. 2253 (1990).

52

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:29

in such situations will require a skillful balancing of worker and owner
interests, a consideration not present in the United States experience.
The commitment to worker and community interests is not equally
strong in all twelve EC member states. For example, it is highly probable
that, in those states carrying forward a two-tier system and its correlative
commitment to codetermination, the duty of the nonexecutive director
when discharging monitoring tasks will have a heavier worker-interest
component to it than in a member state where codetermination has not
been a feature of corporate law and the state has elected only the unitary
board. Indeed, this appears to be the essence of the compromise embodied in the amended draft of the Fifth Directive. 115 Thus, just as societal
interests gave birth to the monitoring duty of outside directors in the
United States, the content of that duty within the EC cannot be expected
to be uniform across all member nations because differences do exist
among the members on a range of social needs and values.
The Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive can therefore be seen as
embracing a monitoring function for both two-tier and unitary board corporations.'1 6 Political realities, however, have produced a structure that
only envisions a monitoring role for nonexecutive directors. But as seen
in the United States, perceptions, or more specifically societal aspirations,
not structural commands, have given body to the monitoring function.
Thus, the ultimate compromise of the amended draft of the Fifth Directive is that it permits local perceptions to complete the mosaic of the monitoring director so that varying social aspirations can be served by the
content each country gives to the monitoring duty.
The willingness to compromise the role of nonexecutive directors as
monitors so that local state interests may be fulfilled is also present in the
Takeover Directive, discussed below. On close review, it is apparent that
in its lacunae there is reason to believe that the United States experience
may once again inform the EC on the proper role of directors in contests
for control.

III. THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
The impetus for the Takeover Directive is the many and significant
differences that exist within the EC countries in their respective regulation of takeovers and defensive maneuvers. Not only does the frequency
of takeovers vary across EC countries, but the extent to which takeovers
are regulated by statutes, self-regulatory bodies, and case law differ sub115. Amended Draft of the Fifth Directive, supra note 3, arts. 2, 3.
116. Id. art 1.
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stantially from country to country. 117 Most takeover activity in the EC
occurs in the United Kingdom, where the most detailed set of takeover
regulations exists.1 18 Indeed, some have found the United Kingdom's regulation of takeovers to be a suitable comparison for efforts by the United
States to reform its own takeover laws. 119
Until recently, from a practical, as well as a legal point of view, takeovers have been much less of a concern in continental Europe. 120 Structural, legal, and economic differences among businesses all account for

117. For a general overview of the takeover problems and regulation in most EC Member States,
see THE REGuLATIONS GOVERNING MEROERS & ACQUISITIONS ACROSS THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY
Uosephine Carr, ed., Int'l Fin. L Rev. Supp. 1989). See also a more detailed account in H. LEIGH
FFRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKE-OvERs AND MERGERS: THE EC, NORTHERN EUROPE, AND SCANDNAvIA (1986); H. LEIGH FFRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKE-OVERS AM MERGERS: SotrruRN EUROPE, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST (1987).
118. For statistics concerning purchases of enterprises by EC companies, see Europe Gears up for
Takeovers, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS ACROSS THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 117, at 5-10.
Takeovers, mergers, and other acquisition activities related to quoted companies in the United
Kingdom are policed by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a self-regulatory body established
by various financial services and industrial bodies in the United Kingdom. The general principles on
takeovers are laid down by the Panel in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 3 PALMER'S COMPANY LAW D-001, at 4505 (Clive M. Schmitthoff, ed., 24th ed. 1987) (revised 1990) [hereinafter City
Code]. For a general discussion of regulation in the United Kingdom on takeovers, see JOHN H.
FARRAR ETr
AL., FARRARs's CoMPANY LAw (2d ed. 1988). Farrar notes that "[tihe United Kingdom is
unique in that it still leaves a substantial part of regulation, including disclosure, to the City Takeover
Code whose juridical basis is obscure." John H. Farrar, Business Judgment and Defensive Tactics in
Hostile Takeover Bids, 15 CAN. BUS. LJ. 15, 17 (1989).
119. GEoRGE J. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DiSCLoSURE INTHE UK AND THE USA 3-7 (1976).
For a recent comparative study, see Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regula.
tion, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69 (1987).
120. It must be noted that the movement toward a single market by 1992 has increased, and may
even further increase, the number of takeovers, acquisitions, and other kinds of cooperation among
companies in Continental Europe. See Europe Gears up for Takeovers, supra note 117, at 5. Most of
these countries leave the problem to be solved under the general provisions of their company acts and
case law, possibly in combination with general recommendations and rules regulating securities listed
on the stock exchange. See Farrar, supra note 118, at 16.
In continental Europe, mergers may be the most common technique used when cross-border
purchase is not involved. See Malcolm Nicholson, European Community, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS & AcQuiSmnONS ACROSS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 117, at 19. Mergers
between two companies registered in the same member state (national mergers) are harmonized

through the Third Council Directive 78/855 of 9 October 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty Concerning Mergers of Public Limited Liability Companies, 1978 OJ. (L 295) 36. Article 9 of
this Directive requires the board of directors to draw up a detailed report explaining the terms of and
economic grounds for the merger. Id. art. 9. Generally, mergers require shareholder involvement;
Article 7 of the Third Council Directive prescribes that a merger must be approved by two-thirds of
the voters at a general meeting of each company involved. Id. art. 7. A directive on cross-border
mergers has been proposed, but has not yet been enacted by the EC. See Proposal for a Tenth
Council Directive Based on Article 54 (3)(g) of the Treaty Concerning Cross-Border Mergers of Public Limited Companies, 1985 OJ. (C 23) 11.
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this situation. 121 On the continent, there are relatively few companies
listed on the stock exchange compared to the United Kingdom. Also,
ownership of companies on the continent tends to be concentrated in the
hands of a small group of families, banks, holding companies, operating
companies, or mutual funds.1 22 For example, in Germany, where shares
(as well as voting rights) may be deposited in banks or with other persons
friendly to the present board,12 3 one commentator reports that three
banks own more than forty percent of all stock nationwide.12 4 Moreover,
recognition and use of voting agreements and other shareholders' agreements abound in many EC countries which frustrate ex ante takeover activity.1 25 For example, a company may have different classes of shares
with different voting rights, including shares with no voting rights at all.
In some member states, this enables shareholders with a minority of the
subscribed capital of the company to possess the majority of the votes at a
121. This is true even in company law where harmonization of national laws through directives is

rather extensive and has, in comparison with other areas of commercial law, been fairly successful.
Differences in company law among various member states may occur as directives can "bind any
Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic
agencies a competence as to form and means." EEC TREATY art. 189. However, differences are primarily due to the fact that EC company law directives are minimum directives, giving each member
state different options, and allowing the member states to enact more stringent or additional rules
provided that such rules are applied generally.
122. See, eg., Roberto Casati & Fabrizio Arossa, Italy, in THE REGULATIONS GOVmNlo MERGS
& AcQuIsnoNs ACROSS THE EUROPEAN CommuNTrrY, supra note 117, at 42. In France, substantial
blocks of shares remain in such friendly hands as the companies' banks or major suppliers. James A.
Kiernan et al., France, in THE REGULATONS GOVERNINO MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS ACROSS THE EuRoPEAN CotmuITY, supra note 117, at 32. Furthermore, a recent survey shows that 57% of the controlling interests of the 200 largest companies in France are held by family groups. Id. at 27.
123. Such a depot voting rights system is widespread in Germany and provides an effective barrier against hostile takeovers. See Ralph Kaestner et al., West Germany, in THE REGULATIONS GOvERNING MERGERS & AcQuISITONS ACROSS THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY, supra note 117, at 73-74. This is

a feature which strongly distinguishes corporate governance in Germany. See Dirk Schmalenbach,
Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CouPoRATE GOVE.NACE 109, 110 Uoseph C. Lufkin et

al. eds., 1990). Schmalenbach's article contains the following passage:
with so many differences between the German capital markets and their transatlantic and
cross-channel counterparts it is not surprising that corporate governance in Germany is
totally different from that in the United States or the United Kingdom in that shareholder
activism by large institutions, hostile takeovers and shareholder involvement in management are far less prominent in Germany.
Id.
Professor Roe suggests that United States' populism may constrain financial institutions from
being an effective voice in corporate governance by limiting the amount of stock they can own.
Because financial institutions can own only a limited amount of stock in a single company, an institution has little cause to involve itself in active monitoring of management. Mark J. Roe, A Political
Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLum. L REv. 10, 11'(1991).
124. Bernhard Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 Izr'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. L SS 4-236 to -240, at 98-99 (Alfred Conard ed., 1973).
125. For example, some special shareholders agreements designed to discourage hostile takeovers
exist in Spain. Garcia-Pita et al., Spain, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
ACROSS THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrry, supra note 117, at 65.
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general meeting. This result is heightened if the class of shares with the
lesser voting rights is listed at the stock exchange and the shares with
superior voting rights are not listed but closely held. 126 Furthermore, a
company may adopt bylaws which allow it to enforce provisions limiting
the voting rights that can be exercised by individuals and their affiliates.12 7 In some member states, because bearer shares are impermissible,
rules of notification exist for registered shares which tend to delay the
takeover procedure.1 28 Finally, national law varies in the measures a company may undertake to thwart a hostile takeover.12 9 In contrast, shares of
British public companies are often held by smaller investors or investors
who do not have a long-term relationship with the company. 130 These
different ownership patterns, as a practical matter, make the British public corporation a more fertile area for takeover activity than the continen31
tal public corporation.
A. Defensive Maneuvers in the United Kingdom
In view of the above described difference that exists between the
United Kingdom and the other member states, it is not surprising that
the richest source of insights on target management's power to defend
against a hostile takeover is in the United Kingdom. The leading British
case is Hogg v. Cramphom Ltd. ,132 where substantial restrictions were imposed on the directors' ability to fight a suitor's bids without shareholder
involvement. In response to a hostile bid for its common and preferred
126. Germany allows shares with no voting rights. Kaestner et al., supra note 123, at 75. Even
though Denmark does not allow shares without voting rights, differences of up to ten times in voting
rights among various stock classes provide an efficient defense against takeovers. Mikael Lunoe &
Susanne Wibrand, Denmark, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS & AcQUIsrIoNs ACROSS THE

COMMUNITY, supra note 117, at 20-22.
127. E.g., Garcia-Pita et al., supra note 125, at 65.
128. Italy provides one such example. Casati & Arossa, supra note 122, at 48.

EURoPEAN

129. Second Council Directive 77/91 of 13 December 1976 on Coordination of Safeguards
Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Member and Others, Are Required by Member States of
Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in Respect of
the Formation of Public Limited Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their

Capital, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, art. 19, 1977 OJ. (L 26) 1, 7. Article 19
allows the member states to permit a company to acquire its own shares, provided that authorization
by the general meeting is obtained and the value of the acquired shares does not exceed 10% of the
subscribed capital. Id.
130. Usually more than half of the shares of a large company in the United Kingdom are held by
such investors. Max Thorneycroft, United Kingdom, in THE REGuLATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS &
ACQUISmONS ACROSS THE EutOPFAN COMMUNITY, supra note 117, at 67.
131. More specifically, directors in member states other than the United Kingdom enjoy relatively
unbridled discretion under their country's laws to conduct defensive maneuvers should the structural
impediments not be present to eliminate the likelihood of takeovers. See David J. Berger, The Second
Common Market: Developments of a Unified Standardfor Reviewing the Actions of Target Directors in the
United States and the Economic Community, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 1 (1991).
132. Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., I Ch. 254 (1967) (U.K.).
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shares, the target board created a trust for the benefit of the employees of
the company and provided that the board members would be the trustees.
In addition, the target board transferred a large block of authorized but
unissued preferred shares to the trust. Each of these preferred shares carried ten votes per share. 133 As a consequence, the board assured that
over half of the voting power remained in friendly hands. The court held
that this use of directors' power to allot shares was improper.
Interestingly, this holding was made despite the court's finding "that
the directors were not activated by any unworthy motives of personal advantage, but acted as they did in an honest belief that they were doing
what was for the good of the company." 134 The reasons for creating the
trust and defending control were concerns for the unsettling effects that
the potential bidder's takeover attempt could have on employee morale,
the perceived benefits of according employees an equitable interest in the
135 It
company, and the belief that the incumbents were better managers.
is noteworthy that because the bid remained inchoate, the target management did not seek to justify its defensive maneuvers by concerns for the
terms or structure of the hostile bid, such as that the price offered was
unfair or that the bid was structured to be coercive. Hence, the conflict
in Hogg was over the future stewardship of the firm. This no doubt qualifies the court's response, which emphasized the prerogatives of the majority versus the minority by reasoning that, provided the actions were those
of the majority, it would not intervene unless the acts were found to be
"oppressive." 136
The effect of this emphasis is that defensive actions, if approved by a
majority of the shares at a general meeting, carry an extremely high presumption of validity. However, because the defensive maneuvers were undertaken only by the directors rather than by a majority, the court refused
to investigate the rival merits of the bidder's versus the incumbent's control in deciding whether the defensive maneuvers were valid. The court
viewed the directors' action as depriving the majority of their constitutional rights, 137 presumably referring to the shareholders' right to consider actions pertinent to control. Overall, the effect of Hogg is
prophylactic, entrusting questions of defensive maneuvers to a shareholder plebiscite rather than following the United States approach of
133. On the question whether the preferred share could carry ten votes per share, the court ruled
against the company's management, based upon an interpretation of the articles of association of the
company which provided that every share would have only one vote. Id. at 263.
134. Id. at 265.
135. Id. at 265-66.
136. Id. at 268.
137. Id.
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evaluating the appropriateness of the board's unilateral action. 135 Hogg,
however, did not deal with the more troubling question of whether the
directors may act unilaterally to thwart a bid where the directors have a
bona fide belief that the bid is unfair or coercive to the shareholders.
Subsequent decisions in the United Kingdom continue to emphasize
the narrow authority of the target company's directors to take initiatives
that affect shifts in control. For example, the Privy Council in Howard
Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd,139 struck down an issuance of shares
that was approved for the ultimate purpose of reducing the current majority owners to a minority status so that a suitor could launch a bid for
control. Even though the directors in Howard Smith acted to secure an
above-market bid for the company's shares, the court held that the directors had acted beyond the sphere of their managerial authority by attempting to erode the power of the holders of a majority of the shares or
to create a new majority stockholder.14° In so concluding, Lord Wilberforce offered the following narrow description of the directors' powers in
takeover contests:
Directors are of course entitled to offer advice, and bound to supply
information relevant to the making of such a decision, but to use their
fiduciary power solely for the purpose of shifting the power to decide to
whom and at what price shares are to be sold cannot be related to any
purpose4 for which the power over the share capital was conferred upon
them.1 1
A significant influence today on the British jurisprudence of takeover
defenses are the limits that the London City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers (City Code) places on defensive maneuvers taken by public corporations.' 42 Once an offer is made or otherwise appears imminent, Rule
21 of the City Code requires that transactions which could frustrate the
bid must be approved by the target company's shareholders.' 4 3 Thus,
little discretion appears to remain for the target company's directors, except to prefer openly, or to take modest steps to favor, one suitor over
138. This was the actual result reached in Hogg. The court suspended its order and permitted the
matter to be considered at a general meeting. At the subsequently convened general meeting, the
shareholders ratified each defensive maneuver previously undertaken by the management. Id. at 272.
139. Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd., 1974 App. Cas. 821 (P.C. 1974) (U.K.).
140. Id. at 837.
141. Id. at 838.
142. The City Code does not have legal binding force. However, both government and selfregulatory organizations require that those who "seek to take advantage of the securities markets in
the United Kingdom conduct themselves in matters relating to takeovers in accordance with... the
[City] Code." City Code, supra note 118, at 4517. Those who do not comply with the standard set
by the City Code may be subject to administrative sanctions or revocation of authorization. Id. In
practice, parties generally consult the executive before they start takeover transactions in order to
prevent a breach of the City Code. Id. at 4519.
143. Id. Rule 21.
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another when there are rival bidders. 144 Therefore, as a consequence of
the City Code, there is little opportunity for target management to engage
in defensive maneuvers, so that the frequency of litigation over the defensive maneuvers is greatly reduced.
The British experience, being the richest among the members of the
EC, demonstrates little of the growth, tension, or retrenchment of the
United States experience. The combination of cases such as Hogg and
legislation like the City Code restrict the directors' ability to act without
the prior approval of a majority of the shareholders. Additionally, with
the impact of the City Code, the ambit within which such questions may
arise is even more constricted and comes into existence whenever a bid
exists or is imminent. Overall, it is unrealistic to expect that insight can
be gained on the scope of the directors' monitoring duties in the context
of takeovers on the same scale in the United Kingdom as in the United
States. The British experience does, however, provide a reference point
from which the incompleteness of the Takeover Directive can be appreciated, and the relevance of the United States experience in forecasting the
potential role of directors and courts under the Takeover Directive can be
understood.
B.

The Takeover Directive's Gaps and the Need for Monitoring

The general principles of the Takeover Directive, as established in
the Directive's preamble, recognize and underscore the need for shareholder protection when a company is subject to a takeover. 145 A correla144. See, eg., Dawson Int'l Plc v. Coats Patons Plc, 1989 B.C.C. 405 (U.K.); Heron Int'l Ltd. v.
Lord Grade, 1983 B.C.L.C. 244 (U.K.).
145. The style and content of the Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, is very
similar to the City Code, supra note 118. See FFRENCH, INTERNATIoNAL LAW OF TAKoVEiS AND MEROEas: THE EEC, NoRTmUm EURoPE, AND ScANoINAvA, supra note 117, at 5-10.
The five general principles of the Takeover Directive are that:
(I) all holders of securities of the target company who are in the same position must be
treated equally;
(2) the addressees of a bid must have sufficient time and information to enable them to
reach a properly informed decision on the bid;
(3) the board of the target company must act in the interests of all the shareholders, and
cannot frustrate the bid;
(4) false markets must not be created in the securities of the target company, the bidder
company or of any other company concerned with the bid;
(5) the target company must not be hindered in conducting its affairs beyond a reasonable
time by a bid for its securities.
Original Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, recital 5(a). See also id. art. 6(1). Article 6(1)
outlines the principles of the supervisory authority's discharge of functions. The Original Draft of
the Takeover Directive prescribes that each member state must designate a supervisory authority to
ensure that the parties to a takeover fulfill their obligations. Id. art. 6. In contrast to the original
draft of the Takeover Directive, the scope of the amended draft of the Takeover Directive is restricted. The amended directive applies only to companies whose securities are admitted for trading
on one or more of the stock exchanges in the EC. See Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive,
supra note 4, art. 1. As the Directive is a "minimum directive," each member state is free to apply its
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tive standard reflecting concern for protecting shareholders is the
Directive's philosophy that shareholders who are in like positions shall be
treated equally. This leads to the requirement that a bidder who acquires
more than one-third of a company's shares be obliged to make a bid to
acquire all of the company's shares. 146 There are also disclosure requirements that the bidder must satisfy in connection with its bid, as well as
numerous requirements pertaining to the structure of the bidding
process.
The Directive's concern is not exclusively to safeguard shareholders
against bidders. 147 The Directive also seeks minimal protection against
decisions taken by the board of the target company. As previously discussed, takeover bids create the potential for conflicts of interest among
directors. The target board's motives for launching a defense to a hostile
takeover are usually unclear. Even if the defense is prompted by concerns
for the best interests of a company, an important question arises as to
whether it is appropriate for the board to interject itself between the bidder and the corporation's owners. The Takeover Directive provides a
limited answer to this question.
The Takeover Directive's Article 8(1) modestly restricts the power of
the board of the target company to act defensively. After being informed
about a takeover bid, 148 and until the result of the bid is made public, the
board cannot, without the authorization of the general meeting of the
shareholders, decide:
(a) To issue shares and other securities carrying or which can be
converted into carrying voting rights;
(b) To engage in transactions which would have the effect of altering significantly the assets or debts of the company or resulting in the
company entering into commitments without consideration (such
own rules to companies whose securities are not listed. Further, under Article 1, the Commission
shall, after a period of five years, submit to the Council a report on the extension of the scope of the
Directive to some or all nonlisted companies. Id.
146. The percentage of ownership shares which triggers the requirement that a bid must be made
for all shares of the company cannot be fixed at more than 33%. Amended Draft of the Takeover
Directive, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
147. For further protection of the target company's shareholders, as well as investors in general,
the Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive requires an extensive offer document which sets forth
details of the economic and other conditions of the offer, as well as various information concerning
the bidder. Additionally, the bidder's organization and intentions regarding the continuation of the
business of the target company must be given. Id. art. 10. Such documentation must accord with
Article 11. Id. art. 11. The acceptance must not occur less than four weeks nor more than ten weeks
from publication of the offer document. Id. art. 12.
148. To reduce the risk of insider trading, the bidder is required not only to make the offer
document public, but also to disclose his decision to make a bid. Prior to the disclosure to the public,
the supervisory authority and the board of the target company shall be informed in accordance with
Article 11. For details concerning the threefold disclosure procedure to be observed by the bidder,
see id. art. 7.
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transactions may, however, be carried out without a general
meeting
149
provided they are authorized by the supervisory authority);
150
(c) To have the company acquire its own shares.
Thus, once a bid is commenced, initiatives such as issuing shares,
granting options on shares, purchasing the company's own shares, issuing
debentures convertible into shares, selling material assets or entering into
contracts or other business transactions of exceptional nature cannot be
carried out unless approved by the majority of the shareholders represented at a general meeting;15 1 any such general meeting must be held
within the period established for acceptance.15 2 Furthermore, even
though prior to the announcement of a takeover bid, the board was authorized to increase the share capital of the company or was authorized to
buy the company's own shares, once the bid is announced, the actual
issuance or purchase of shares must be approved by the shareholders at a
153
general meeting.
Article 8 does not exclude the board from taking all defensive steps.
For example, the Takeover Directive does not prohibit the target board
from initiating the purchase of an insignificant amount of assets that nevertheless place regulatory obstacles (e.g., antitrust) in the hostile bidder's
path. The Directive also does not prohibit the awarding of golden
parachutes, 154 provided they become the obligation of the firm acquiring
the target company. Moreover, the prohibitions of Article 8 do not apply
until the bidder has made disclosures to the target company's board, as
required by Article 7(1).155 Thus, a nimble board, when it believes or
knows a bid is imminent, can erect substantial barriers in an unwanted
suitor's path. Hence, significant defensive maneuvers can be undertaken
in that crucial window of time when a bid is imminent, but not formally
149. In doing so, the five general principles of the Directive mentioned previously guide the supervisory authority. See supra note 145.
150. See Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(2).
151. The majority required is regulated by the company act in each EC member state and depends on the kind of decision proposed and the bylaws of the company. Decisions requiring alteration of the bylaws (for example, in order to increase share capital) must be decided by statutory
majority. For a comprehensive view of the majority required in different EC countries, see PENNINGTON & WOOLuDOa, supra note 81.

152. Article 8 of the Original Draft of the Takeover Directive was not explicit that a general
meeting was to be held after announcement of the bid. Under the terms of the Amended Takeover
Directive, the board of directors may call a general meeting before the expiration of the period of
acceptance. See Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8.
153. This is true even though the Second Directive permits prior authorization of the board's
increase of share capital, id. art. 25, and purchase of the company's own shares, id. art. 19.
154. Golden parachute is a term commonly used to refer to contractual arrangements which provide substantial benefits to executives, managers, or other employees of a potential target company if
they leave or are forced to leave the target company following a takeover. See LEWIs D. SOLOMON ET
AL., COPRPORATIONS LAW AND POUCY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1061 (1988).

155. Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, arts. 7(1), 8.
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undertaken. Finally, measures which from the very beginning may prevent takeovers in general can be decided by the board without shareholder approval, provided that such steps do not otherwise require a
decision by the general meeting. Thus, Article 8 fails to reach poison
pills156 issued prior to a hostile bid being launched and does not prohibit
various governance procedures from being adopted which may serve as
barriers to a potential suitor's takeover. In sum, the Takeover Directive
does not reach many defensive maneuvers and allows the target board of
directors significant discretion in mounting an aggressive defense prior to
157
the bid's formal commencement.
The approach taken by the Takeover Directive is far less restrictive
than its counterpart in the City Code. To be sure, both Rule 21 of the
City Code and the provisions of the Takeover Directive place conditions
upon the issuance of shares, options and securities convertible into
158 It
shares, as well as substantial dispositions and acquisitions of assets.
is the proscription of "contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of
business" in the City Code that provides it with a breadth far greater
than that of the Takeover Directive. 159 Through this provision, a wide
array of defensive maneuvers can be prohibited by the City Code. In
contrast, the Takeover Directive proscribes only those acts that fall within
one of three distinct categories of defensive maneuvers: issuing securities,

156. Poison pills are devices intended to deter takeovers by making the swallowing of a target
corporation unpleasant for the bidder. See Solomon, supra note 154, at 1137-38.
157. The scope of art. 8(b) of the Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, which prohibits the
board from undertaking a transaction that significantly alters the firm's assets or debts, seems to be
less extensive than that of the original Takeover Directive. The latter covered "transactions which do
not have the character of current operations included under normal conditions." Original Draft of
the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(l)(b). See also the fifth general principle of the Takeover
Directive, supra note 145. The amended version covers "operations which would have the effect of
altering significantly the assets or liabilities." Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4,
art. 8(b).
The Commission of the EC has not explained this change in its published comments, but it
seems to reveal concern that the original wording went too far by hindering the target company from
continuing its day-to-day business during the time of the bid. Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(b). Therefore, it seems more likely that the board under the current version
of the directive may, without shareholders' involvement, fulfill substantial obligations undertaken in
contracts signed before the takeover bid was initiated.
158. Under the Original Draft of the Takeover Directive, the limit on asset dispositions applies to
those that "have the effect of altering significantly the assets or liabilities" of the company. Original
Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(b). Rule 21 of the City Code more directly
proscribes such transactions that involve "assets of a material amount." City Code, supra note 118,
Rule 21. However, the materiality of the assets involved is relative to the overall size of the firm or its
earnings. Thus, it appears that in this respect the proposed Takeover Directive and the City Code
take a similar course.
159. City Code, supra note 118, Rule 21(e).
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significantly altering the firm's assets,16° or purchasing shares. Moreover,
the prohibitions of the City Code arise earlier, because they apply not just
when a bid is in process, but whenever "the board of the offeree company
has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent.'161 In
contrast, the Takeover Directive's prohibitions arise only after a bid is
formally commenced by making the disclosures required in Article (7)(1).
Thus, the City Code regulates defensive maneuvers invoked in anticipation of a hostile takeover, whereas such acts escape regulation under the
Takeover Directive.
A further concern regarding Article 8 of the Takeover Directive
stems from the fact that it permits transactions that significantly alter a
firm's assets or liabilities if the particular supervisory authority of the
member state approves such a transaction. The more traditional corporate governance approach in member states to transactions involving potential self-interest is review and approval by the shareholders. The
prophylactic effects of shareholder approval arise from the disclosure that
accompanies such approval and the involvement of disinterested owners
in the decision-making process. Each is a deterrent to harmful managerial
self-interest. In contrast, some concern is warranted over the desirability
of placing such an approval mechanism in the supervisory authority for
transactions that not only will significantly affect the firm's assets and
liabilities but could well discourage a hostile bid's continuance. The supervisory authority's normal experience lies in reviewing filings, assuring
that disclosure requirements are met, and scrutinizing market trading for
possible abuses and manipulation. The competence of the supervisory
authority to consider matters more germane to the conduct of business is
untested and therefore uncertain. Furthermore, permitting local officials
to act without defining the range of their discretion invites a response to
purely parochial interests. For example, we question just how free of local
influence a Belgian supervisory authority will be when asked to opine on a
transaction that will make a bidder's takeover more difficult if that bidder
is a German corporation and the target of a Belgian corporation. On the
other hand, the utilization of the supervisory authority can be seen as a
necessary safeguard that may be resorted to in order to avoid the delay
that would otherwise occur if a general meeting were required to approve
a beneficial transaction. This may suggest how utilization of the supervi160. As discussed previously, the Original Draft of the Takeover Directive reached "transactions
which do not have the character of current operations concluded under normal conditions." Original Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(b). This language would appear to parallel
that of the City Code's "ordinary course of business." City Code, supra note 118, Rule 21. The
dropping of this language further demonstrates the retreat in the Amended Draft of the Takeover
Directive from the original position. Amended Draft of the Takeover Directive, supra note 4.
161. City Code, supra note 118, Rule 21.
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sory authority can be restricted so as to preserve the shareholders' traditional role of overcoming managerial self-interest; the supervisory
authority's power to act should be confined to truly exigent situations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, it appears that the Takeover Directive leaves a wide area within which the directors may invoke a full
panoply of defensive maneuvers. Unlike the City Code, the Takeover
Directive does not constrain managerial discretion with respect to takeovers in such a way as to leave little for fiduciary duty principles to regulate. Under the Takeover Directive, there is as much need to resort to
fiduciary duty principles to regulate defensive maneuvers as there is in the
United States. The great question here is whether this need will be met.
The Fifth Directive can be read as imposing duties on the directors similar to those that exist under United States fiduciary law. But in this respect, both the Fifth Directive and the Takeover Directive each raise as
many questions as they answer because each, in its own manner, deals
incompletely with the obligations of directors. This should be seen as
inviting reference to the experience the United States has gained in grappling with similar questions.
The message from the experience in the United States is clear. The
outside directors are not merely participants in the formation of corporation strategies, but are required to fulfill a role as monitors of management's stewardship. They must disabuse themselves of thinking theirs
and the shareholders' interests are identical to those of the managers. A
similar approach is found in the Fifth Directive. However, the standard
of care and skill for board members is not articulated in the Fifth Directive and, otherwise, remains inchoate in the jurisprudence of most member states. When confronted with a takeover, the standard must be found
in the Takeover Directive's general concerns for shareholder protection
and involvement. The Takeover Directive, however, does not focus on
the specific role to be played by outside directors in fundamental decisions such as takeovers, a situation where the interests of management
and shareholders may collide.
If shareholder protection is to be effective within the EC, the different roles to be played by executive and nonexecutive directors must be
reflected and stressed in the Takeover Directive and must find further
elaborations in the Fifth Directive, as well. This necessary development
appears unlikely to occur. Presently, neither the amended drafts of the
Fifth Directive nor the Takeover Directive has been enacted. The Commission is engaged in bilateral negotiations with each member state concerning the two directives. The limited experience that most of the
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members have had with takeovers and, in turn, defensive maneuvers, may
deny the EC the experience to deal more directly with the issue. Their
limited experience may well retard their embracing a rigorous approach
such as that of the City Code, or prescribing more precisely monitoring
duties of directors. If such steps are not taken, then reference to the experience and case law of the United States can light the path for the member states' courts to follow.

